The Last Dependency
Throughout all of recorded history, even the most brutal systems of power shared a single constraint: they needed people. Not out of kindness, not out of moral obligation, but out of the most basic operational necessity. A pharaoh needed laborers to build monuments and farmers to produce grain. A Roman emperor needed legions to hold borders and slaves to work estates. A medieval lord needed serfs to work the land and soldiers to defend it. A factory owner needed workers to operate the machinery. Power, in every form it has ever taken, has been fundamentally dependent on human bodies and human minds.
This dependency created a floor — a minimum level of maintenance below which exploitation became self-defeating. You could work your population hard. You could pay them little. You could constrain their freedoms and extract their labor under conditions that were, by any humane standard, monstrous. But you could not let them die faster than they could be replaced, because there was no other source of what they provided. Dead workers do not make new workers. This was not mercy. It was arithmetic.
The logic extended upward from the most basic labor to the most specialized knowledge. Every society has had individuals whose expertise was so rare and so expensive to produce that they gained a form of personal leverage disproportionate to their social class. The Soviet Union needed nuclear physicists. It could imprison dissidents, silence journalists, starve entire regions — but it could not simply dispose of Andrei Sakharov, because producing another mind capable of that work required decades of education and a convergence of talent that could not be commanded into existence. The master surgeon, the brilliant engineer, the gifted cryptographer — these individuals were protected not by rights but by scarcity. Their knowledge was difficult to acquire, impossible to copy, and lost entirely when they died. This gave them a bargaining position that no political system could fully override.
AI attacks this protection at its root. The leverage never came from the knowledge being valuable; it came from the knowledge being scarce, slow to produce, and lost when its holder died. Encoded in a model, expertise stops having those properties. What one system learns, every instance of it knows — no twenty-year training pipeline, no irreplaceable individual, no personality to tolerate, no politics to manage, no family needing housing and schooling. This is not yet true of every expert domain, and in the hardest ones it may be a long way off. But it does not have to be finished to work. Scarcity is a spectrum, and leverage falls as scarcity falls. The expert who is merely uncommon has far less bargaining power than the expert who is irreplaceable, and the direction of travel is from the second toward the first. One learns. All know.
The dependency extended further still — into the domain of organized violence. The history of democratic rights is, in significant part, a history of military necessity. Citizens gained political power when states needed their willing participation in warfare. The Greek city-states extended political rights to the classes that rowed warships and carried spears. The expansion of suffrage in Europe tracked closely with the expansion of conscript armies. Veterans’ benefits, social contracts, the welfare state — all are downstream of a basic bargain: you need us to fight for you, so you must give us something worth fighting for. The population’s role as a reservoir of military manpower has been one of the most powerful drivers of political inclusion in human history.
Autonomous weapons systems remove this leverage with the same finality that AI removes the expert’s leverage. You do not negotiate with a drone fleet. You do not owe it voting rights, pensions, or a GI Bill. A state that can project military force without drawing from its population has no structural need to accommodate that population’s political demands. The oldest mechanism by which ordinary people extracted concessions from power — the implicit threat of withholding cooperation in violence — ceases to function.
But beneath all of these dependencies — labor, expertise, military service — lay one that was so fundamental it was rarely even articulated. Humans can only be produced by humans. Every worker who died had to be replaced by another who had been born, raised, fed, educated, and kept healthy long enough to be useful. The supply chain for a human worker was, in effect, all of civilization: families, communities, schools, hospitals, agriculture, housing, social stability sufficient to produce functional adults. Maintaining this supply chain was expensive and complex, and it imposed constraints on power that nothing else could. You could be as ruthless as you wished with the current generation, but only up to the point where you threatened the production of the next one.
Robots that build robots erode this floor.
That last sentence is doing a great deal of work, so it needs care. Nothing today builds itself. A modern factory is a global supply chain — mines, refineries, chip fabs, shipping, and a great many human hands — and a fully self-reproducing machine system remains a thing nobody has built. But the floor was never made of “zero humans.” It was made of how many, and how replaceable each one is. The relevant question is not whether the last person leaves the loop. It is whether the number of people required to sustain production keeps falling, and whether those who remain are rare enough to hold leverage. A lights-out factory running unattended overnight does not need a society around it. It needs a supply chain, and supply chains employ fewer people every year.
The supply chain for a mechanical worker is materials, energy, a factory, and fewer people every year. The worker itself needs no family. No community. No school. No twenty-year maturation period. No psychological needs. No cultural infrastructure. Need more? Build more. Need different capabilities? Software update. One breaks? Replace it. No funeral, no grieving family, no pension, no risk of the replacement developing inconvenient political opinions.
The scaling arithmetic is devastating. A human workforce requires an entire society to sustain it — an interconnected web of institutions, relationships, and resources that took centuries to develop and must be continuously maintained. A robotic workforce requires a manufacturing line, a power grid, and a shrinking number of people. The first constrains power in a thousand ways. The second constrains it in fewer every year.
For the first time in the history of organized civilization, it is possible to imagine a power structure whose dependency on the general population trends toward zero. Not reduced for a season, the way a bad harvest or a slump reduces it — structurally, and in every pillar at once. Labor, expertise, military service, and the reproduction of the workforce were four separate constraints, and they are loosening together. You do not need the trend to complete to feel the effect. Leverage is not a switch; it is a price. Each pillar that weakens lowers what power must pay to keep the arrangement, and the payments were never charity. They were the price of needing us.
Every moral argument for human dignity still holds. But moral arguments have never been what actually protected people. Structural necessity did. And every pillar of that necessity is weakening simultaneously.
But someone will stop this. The governments, the institutions, the regulators — they will see the danger and act. The powerful are not monsters. They understand that a world without a functioning society is a world not worth inhabiting. They will choose restraint. Won’t they?